# Carbon pricing: indispensible – charging 180€/t now: inconsiderate

Impulse to the panel discussion


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#### INREC 2020 | Essen, 09. September 2020

# **Global coordination is crucial for ultimate success**


CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in selected countries and country groups



- EU and Germany can only make very small direct contribution to curb global warming
- EU needs a strong negotiation position to influence global climate policy
  - reciprocity / efficiency / side effects
- Prices as coordination devices
  - CO<sub>2</sub>-price sets incentives for investments
  - CO<sub>2</sub>-price strengthens incentives for innovations
  - Complementary: Promotion of (basic) research and development at EU level

#### EU: Different approach for ETS and non-ETS sectors

**Greenhouse gas emissions in the EU by sector** Change from 2005 to 2018




- EU-wide Emissions Trading System (EU ETS): around 45% of EU emissions
  - Energy
  - Industry
  - Intra-EU flights
- Emissions outside EU ETS (non-ETS): "effortsharing", specifying separate reduction targets for each member state
  - Transport
  - Households
  - Agriculture

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# **Reliable emissions reduction in the EU ETS sectors**


Carbon price of emission allowances in the EU ETS



EU ETS is functional market-based instrument, after all

- Targeted emissions reduction is met reliably by construction of system
- Prices have been stabilized by introducing market stability reserve
- Germany: EEG and discretionary coal phase-out work in EU ETS sectors
  - No additional emissions reduction through national measures in this area without accompanying measures

#### **Fragmented approach in the non-ETS sectors**



Sources: Eurostat, own calculations


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- Fragmented national approaches in Non-ETS sectors
  - Separate national targets in sub- and subsub-sectors; small-scale action plans
  - Unsystematic taxes and duties regarding climate effects
- Non-compliance with effort sharing targets could lead to high costs or infringement proceedings
- Main goal: expansion of EU ETS to all sectors in all member states
  - Short-term interim solution necessary

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# Credibility of the system is the key for its impact



Sources: World Bank, own calculations

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 CO<sub>2</sub> pricing only takes full effect with credible commitment by government


- CO<sub>2</sub> tax rate needs to credibly react
- Risk of reduction of targeted quantity if prices rise quickly/ to high levels
- Price floor to address regulatory uncertainty / waterbed effect / international negotiations
  - Market stability reserve in EU ETS already implements type of price floor and ceiling

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#### **Regressive effect can even be reversed completely**

Absolute and relative burdens at a uniform carbon price of €35 per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> by income tenths




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Sources: Federal Statistical Office, Pothen and Tovar Reaños (2018), RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe 2013 Grundfile 5 (HB), own calculations - Lower income groups have to pay larger share of income due to CO<sub>2</sub> pricing

- Large heterogeneity within groups
- Lump-sum reimbursement per capita would on average in total lead to higher income up until fifth decile
- Reducing electricity costs would have strengthening effect on sector coupling
  - Reduction of direct taxes or social security payments could have positive effects on production and employment
  - Existing mechanisms in transfer system already address hardest hit cases

# **Effect of CO<sub>2</sub> pricing on households**

Relative reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions according to different price and elasticity scenarios and the corresponding relative annual burden after lump-sum return for different carbon prices



Relative carbon reduction:

before redistribution

Relative burden after redistribution (right-hand scale):

◆ Median Ⅰ Interquartile distance

Sources: Federal Statistical Office, Pothen and Tovar Reaños (2018), RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe 2013 Grundfile 5 (HB), own calculations

- Price sets incentives for behavior and investment in equipment and durable goods
  - Level of CO<sub>2</sub> price and price sensitivity of households determine total CO<sub>2</sub> reduction
- Targeted accompanying measures to intensify adjustment
  - Subsidies for low-emission equipment
  - Incentives for landlords to invest in rental objects
  - Infrastructure investments, e.g. local transportation or grid and storage infrastructure
- Disruptive implementation: counterproductive